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In this Article, I argue that the spirit of Swift v. Tyson is alive
today—and that it’s a good thing too.1 As it is usually understood,
Swift depended on a nonpositivist theory of the common law that
few currently share.2 I will argue that Swift was in fact struggling
with a question of state law that commonly arises today. This is the
question of extrajurisdictional effect—that is, whether state author-
ities intend their legal rules to be used in other court systems.3 
Extrajurisdictional effect is puzzling because, absent certification,
the courts of the state whose rules are at issue have no occasion to
discuss it. They are concerned with the rules they are obligated to
follow, because that is what matters to the parties before them.
What the courts of other jurisdictions should do is a question that
those courts will face. As a result, extrajurisdictional effect is the
* Michael Steven Green, Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, College of William &
Mary. I would like to thank the participants in the symposium at William & Mary—as well
as Larry Kramer and Brian Bix—for helpful comments on this Article. This Article was
written with support from the Robert E. & Elizabeth S. Scott Research Professorship.
1. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 245
(1977); Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism,
and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 115-16 (1993) (“In the years
that followed Swift ... the change that finally brought about Erie and Klaxon was [positivism,]
a revolution in legal philosophy.”); William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of
Constitutional Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907, 907-08 (1988) (“The general acceptance of
positivism in this century virtually dictated the overruling of Swift v. Tyson.”).
3. One might understand extrajurisdictional effect to concern whether events beyond the
state’s borders fall within a legal rule’s scope. An example would be whether New York’s
attorney-client privilege applies to communications between a New York attorney and her
client that occur in Pennsylvania. As I use the term here, however, extrajurisdictional effect
concerns a different matter, namely whether a state’s legal rule is intended to be used by
other court systems. Assume, for example, that a New York state court would apply its
attorney-client privilege to communications made in Pennsylvania. That does not mean that
the law has extrajurisdictional effect in the relevant sense, for New York courts may not think
that Pennsylvania state courts must apply the New York rule to those same communications.
I thank Brian Bix for encouraging me to clarify this point.
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legal equivalent of dark matter, which can be observed only through
its gravitational effect upon other bodies.4 Unless the question of
extrajurisdictional effect is certified to the relevant state’s supreme
court, the only courts that will discuss it are those not in a position
to provide authoritative answers. This gives a misty and jurispru-
dential aura to what is in fact a straightforward question of state
law.
This Article has three Parts. I devote the first to showing that the
conception of the general common law expressed in Swift v. Tyson
was compatible with legal positivism. In the second, I argue that the
heart of the disagreement between advocates of Swift and Erie was
a difference of opinion about extrajurisdictional effect: in particular,
whether a state’s officials wanted the decisions of the state’s courts
concerning the common law to bind federal and sister state courts
when adjudicating events occurring within the state’s borders. What
made the disagreement so intractable—and what made it appear as
if it was a jurisprudential question to be resolved through a priori
reasoning—was that it concerned dark matter. The courts of the
state whose decisions were at issue never had occasion to settle the
question. Had certification been possible, the disagreement could
have been quickly resolved. 
In the third Part, I argue that the problem of dark matter still
arises and produces positions akin to Swift and Erie. One example
concerns the law of choice of law. There is currently a debate about
whether federal and sister state courts should respect a state’s
choice-of-law rules. Courts generally take a Swiftian approach to the
question. The fact that a state supreme court would not apply the
state’s law to certain facts does not mean that federal or sister state
courts cannot. But a number of scholars have argued that an Erie
approach should be used. State supreme court decisions should be
treated as authoritative concerning the territorial scope of the
state’s law.
Here too the debate has proved intractable because it is about
dark matter. No state supreme court has ever had occasion to decide
whether its choice-of-law rules have extrajurisdictional effect. The
4. For a discussion of dark matter, see Michael D. Lemonick & J. Madeleine Nash, The
Dark Side of the Cosmos, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 48, 48-49, available at http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,977502,00.html. 
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absence of authoritative decisions has made the debate appear as if
it is a jurisprudential matter to be resolved by a priori reasoning.
But a very simple solution has been ignored: certification of the
question to the relevant state supreme court. I argue that the
consequence of such certification would be a vindication of Swift
over Erie.
I. POSITIVISM
As it is usually described, Swift v. Tyson depended upon a
nonpositivist conception of the common law.5 To get a clear view of
whether this is in fact true, we need some understanding about
what legal positivism and its competitors are.
Current philosophers of law generally identify legal positivism by
means of two theses. According to the social fact thesis, the law of a
jurisdiction is fundamentally a matter of social facts—usually con-
cerning the attitudes and actions of officials within that juris-
diction.6 According to the separability thesis, the content of the law
need not overlap with morality, although it often does so as a
contingent matter.7 
A good example of legal positivism is the theory of law offered by
H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law.8 According to Hart, a norm, such
as “do not drive over 25 mph,” is the law if it satisfies the criteria for
enforceability that have been accepted by a community of offi-
cials—judges, legislators, sheriffs, and the like.9 For example, the
norms identified in the Securities Exchange Act are law because
they satisfy the criteria, such as promulgation in accordance with
the United States Constitution, that American officials have ac-
cepted for identifying norms that may be backed up by their power.
Hart calls this official practice of enforcing norms on the basis of
5. See infra note 50.
6. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241, 241 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
7. See, e.g., id.
8. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
9. See id. at 94. The existence of a rule of recognition in a legal system also requires that
the primary rules that are valid according to the rule of recognition be generally—although
not necessarily always—obeyed by the population. Id. at 116-17.
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accepted criteria a rule of recognition.10 Hart’s theory of law is
positivist because the existence and content of a rule of recognition
are matters of social fact, and the criteria in a rule of recognition
can identify norms as enforceable even if they deviate from moral-
ity.
Positivism and its nonpositivist competitors are general theories
of law—that is, they are accounts of what is essential to law
wherever it occurs.11 Just as it is essential to all bachelors that they
are unmarried males, under Hart’s theory it is essential to all laws
that a rule of recognition identifies them as such. In this sense, Hart
thinks that the law is constituted by social facts. If morality
somehow disappeared, but official practices of norm enforcement
continued, law would continue too. In contrast, some nonpositivists
argue that social facts are necessary but not sufficient for law; moral
or evaluative facts are needed as well.12 If evaluative facts disap-
peared, so would law, even if official practices of norm enforcement
remained.13 Under a more extreme form of nonpositivism, social
facts are not even necessary for law.14
Because it claims to be a theory of what is essential for law,
positivism—if correct—is a necessary restriction on the law, beyond
anyone’s control. The fact that officials in a legal system are com-
mitted to a nonpositivist theory of law cannot make their law
nonpositivist. All it means is that the officials are conceptually
confused. They do not understand the law of their own jurisdiction.15 
10. Id. at 107.
11. See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin’s Fallacy?: A Reply
to Justice in Robes, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 33, 34-36 (2008); Michael Steven Green,
Dworkin v. The Philosophers: A Review Essay on Justice in Robes, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1477,
1479-82.
12. See, e.g., Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 157, 157 (2004). 
13. See id. at 159.
14. I argue that Hans Kelsen denied that social facts are necessary for law in Kelsen,
Quietism, and the Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 351, 369-71 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009)
[hereinafter Green, Rule of Recognition], and Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems, 54
ALA. L. REV. 365, 405-07 (2003) [hereinafter Green, Logic of Legal Systems]. Kelsen differed
from nonpositivists, however, in thinking that moral facts are also not necessary for law. See
Green, Rule of Recognition, supra, at 370-71. One way of putting Kelsen’s position, as I read
it, is that law would still exist if both moral and social facts disappeared.
15. The same point is true of nonpositivism, assuming that it is the correct theory of law.
Legal officials committed to a positivist theory of law would be wrong about their own law.
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For a possible example of such conceptual confusion, consider
Justice Field’s opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff.16 According to Field, the
Oregon state court whose judgment against Neff was at issue in
Pennoyer did not have adjudicative power because Neff had not been
present in the state, through his person or property, at the initiation
of the lawsuit.17 Pennoyer is largely remembered for incorporating
these requirements for personal jurisdiction into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.18 But this was dicta because the
Oregon state court’s judgment was issued two years before the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.19 And yet Justice Field still
thought it was appropriate to decide whether the Oregon judgment
was entitled to recognition in federal court on the basis of these
requirements. 
What law of personal jurisdiction was Field applying? We know
it was not Oregon law, positivistically understood—that is, norms
identified as enforceable by Oregon authorities. The assertion of
personal jurisdiction at issue in Pennoyer would have satisfied
Oregon state courts.20 Was it federal law then? It could not, of
course, have been federal constitutional law. Field was clear
that the only relevant constitutional provision, the Fourteenth
Amendment, was not yet binding on the Oregon court’s actions.21
But perhaps it was federal common law—that is, common law
created by federal courts concerning when they should recognize the
judgments of other court systems. So understood, however, Field
should have concluded that the Oregon judgment was valid in the
Oregon state court system. The judgment would have been unen-
forceable in federal court only. And yet he insisted that the require-
ments for personal jurisdiction were binding in Oregon state courts
as well:
16. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
17. Id. at 734. In fact, the enforceability of the Oregon judgment in Pennoyer rested on a
more detailed issue about the law of personal jurisdiction—whether a state court can have
jurisdiction through the defendant’s property if the property was not attached at the initiation
of the lawsuit. See id. at 719-20. I ignore that detail here.
18. Id. at 733-34.
19. Id. at 719. 
20. See id. at 720.
21. See id. at 733.
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[I]f the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
by reason of his nonresidence, and, consequently, no authority
to pass upon his personal rights and obligations; if the whole
proceeding, without service upon him or his appearance, is
coram non judice and void; if to hold a defendant bound by such
a judgment is contrary to the first principles of justice,—it is
difficult to see how the judgment can legitimately have any force
within the State.22
The law of personal jurisdiction as Field understood it appeared to
be nonpositivist. It consisted of norms that were legally binding on
Oregon courts in a manner that was not tied to social facts about
Oregon—or, indeed, federal—officials.
If positivism is correct, Field was wrong. The norms of personal
jurisdiction he spoke of did not have any legal force within the
Oregon state court system. He was confusing the law with some-
thing else—probably morality—that did not depend upon social
facts for its existence and scope. The law he was in fact applying
was probably federal common law binding on only federal courts.
Notice, however, that a positivist need not condemn people as
conceptually confused simply because they use the word “law” in a
manner that is contrary to the positivist theory, for they may be
choosing to use the word “law” in connection with something other
than the law. Consider a theory of banks, according to which they
are necessarily the shores of rivers. It need not follow from this
theory that someone who says she put money in a “bank” is con-
ceptually confused, for she might be using the word to speak of
financial institutions, rather than the banks with which the theory
is concerned. She would be conceptually confused only if she insisted
that she was using the word “bank” in connection with the very
same stuff that the banks-are-shores-of-rivers theory is about. 
Thus, the positivist can condemn Field as conceptually confused
only if Field sought to use the word “law,” and related terms, in
connection with the law—that is, the same stuff with which theories
of law like positivism and its nonpositivist rivals are concerned.
Given that Field was writing a judicial opinion, it is reasonable to
think that he was talking about the law. When he said that the
Oregon judgment lacked any force in Oregon courts, he certainly
22. Id. at 732.
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meant legal force, not simply moral force. And thus, if positivism is
correct, he was conceptually confused.
With Pennoyer as our model, let us now move on to whether the
positivist would condemn Justice Story’s opinion in Swift v.
Tyson—and the Swiftian regime more generally—as conceptually
confused. I will begin with the case for conceptual confusion. In his
opinion in Swift, Story made a statement about the content of the
general common law prevailing in New York that was contrary
to—or at least insensitive to—decisions by New York state courts.23
Furthermore, the law Story was articulating was not characterized
by him as federal law.24 That makes this law sound nonpositivist.
Story apparently said that there were norms legally binding in New
York that did not depend upon social facts about officials, whether
state or federal—the same thing that Field said about the law of
personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer. 
To be sure, these general common law rules—unlike the law of
personal jurisdiction as Field understood it—could be displaced by
state legislation. But if not displaced, they were apparently binding
in a state, whatever the state’s officials had to say about the matter.
They were, as Justice Holmes later put it, “a brooding omnipres-
ence,”25 “a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.”26
It also appears that the same nonpositivist conception of the gen-
eral common law was employed horizontally. If an event arising in
a sister state was covered by the general common law, many state
courts would come to their own conclusion about the content of this
law, without deference to the sister state’s courts.27 State courts
23. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (“[T]he true interpretation and effect [of
commercial instruments] are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in
the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.”).
24. See id.
25. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
26. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
27. See, e.g., Patillo v. Alexander, 30 S.E. 644, 644 (Ga. 1898); Franklin v. Twogood, 25
Iowa 520, 531 (1868); Roads v. Webb, 40 A. 128, 130 (Me. 1898); Fellows v. Harris, 12 Miss.
(12 S. & M.) 462, 466-67 (1849); St. Nicholas Bank v. State Nat’l Bank, 27 N.E. 849, 851 (N.Y.
1891); Faulkner v. Hart, 82 N.Y. 413, 417-18 (1880); Third Nat’l Bank v. Nat’l Bank of
Commerce, 139 S.W. 665, 667-68 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). For a discussion, see Michael Steven
Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1123-24 (2011).
852 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:845
appeared to treat the general common law as a brooding omnipres-
ence too. 
But the argument above misdescribes how federal and state
courts conceived of the general common law. It was not attributed
to a state whatever the state’s officials might say about the matter.
Courts would assume that the general common law applied in a
state—and so would come to their own conclusion about what this
law was—only if the state had a legal system that was based upon
the common law.28 And the question of whether a state’s legal
system was based upon the common law was answered, posi-
tivistically, by reference to social facts about the state’s officials or
inhabitants. 
The positivist basis of the general common law is evident in the
presumptions that courts would use when adjudicating events
occurring in other jurisdictions. During the Swift regime, courts
encountered serious practical difficulties getting information about
the content of another jurisdiction’s law.29 As a result, they were
often faced with the problem of what to do if another jurisdiction’s
law applied, but the parties offered no evidence of the content of
that law. In some cases, the plaintiff’s action was dismissed on the
grounds that he had failed to plead the necessary grounds for
recovery.30 But in other cases, courts would rely upon presumptions
that would allow the plaintiff’s case to proceed.31 
28. See Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 505-06
(2006).
29. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 822-23 (1989).
30. See, e.g., Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 477, 479-80 (1912); Walton v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 543-46 (2d Cir. 1956); Rositzky v. Rositzky, 46 S.W.2d 591, 595
(Mo. 1931); Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp., 156 N.E. 647, 648 (N.Y. 1927); Whitford v. Panama R.R.
Co., 23 N.Y. 465, 467-68, 475 (1861); Christie v. Cerro De Pasco Copper Corp., 211 N.Y.S. 143,
143 (App. Div. 1925); Langdon v. Young, 33 Vt. 136, 138-39 (1860). For a discussion, see
Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. REV.
1237, 1267 & nn.137-38 (2011); Arthur Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to
Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613, 633-34
(1967); Arthur Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1035-36
(1941). Under this approach, a defendant was also not permitted to introduce an affirmative
defense without evidence that it was available under the foreign jurisdiction’s law. See, e.g.,
W. Union Tel. Co. v. Way, 4 So. 844, 852 (Ala. 1887); see also Nussbaum, supra, at 1035 &
n.103.
31. Green, supra note 30, at 1266-71.
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For example, sometimes courts would presume that the law of the
other jurisdiction was the same as their own.32 Because this pre-
sumption allowed the forum to apply even its unusual statutory law
to the dispute, it cannot be understood as an attempt to hazard a
guess at the probable content of the law of the other jurisdiction.
The justification for the presumption was instead that the parties,
by failing to offer evidence of the law of the other jurisdiction, had
consented to the application of forum law.33 
But other presumptions involved guesses at the likely content of
the foreign law. For example, with respect to very rudimentary legal
principles that probably exist in any civilized legal system—such as
the enforceability of contracts or liability for negligence—the court
would often presume that the principles existed in the foreign
jurisdiction unless the defendant could show otherwise.34 Notice,
however, that this presumption extended only to rudimentary legal
principles, not to any common law rule.35
What is important for our purposes is the presumption that
common law principles were binding in another jurisdiction in the
absence of evidence by the parties that such principles had been
displaced by statute.36 This was not a presumption that forum law
applied, for when the common law had been abrogated in the forum
by statute, the common law and not the statute would be presumed
to prevail in the other jurisdiction.37 
If the general common law was truly thought of as a brooding
omnipresence applicable in all jurisdictions unless displaced by
32. Id. at 1269-70.
33. Id. at 1269; Robert von Moschzisker, Presumptions as to Foreign Law, 11 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 10-11 (1926); Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 1036-37; e.g., Watford v. Ala. & Fla.
Lumber Co., 44 So. 567, 568 (Ala. 1907); Peet v. Hatcher, 21 So. 711, 713 (Ala. 1896). For a
criticism of the use of such a presumption in an interstate context, see Green, supra note 30,
at 1269-71.
34. Green, supra note 30, at 1268; e.g., Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Rivers,
211 F. 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1914); Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Ry. Co., 93 N.E. 590, 593 (Mass. 1911);
Mackey v. Mexican Cent. Ry. Co., 78 N.Y.S. 966, 966-67 (City Ct. 1902).
35. Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 1038.
36. The idea, which made some sense when statutory abrogation of the common law was
relatively rare, was that the common law rule probably still applied in a common law legal
system. Green, supra note 30, at 1268.
37. See, e.g., Riedman v. Macht, 183 N.E. 807, 809 (Ind. App. 1932); see also Brainerd
Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964, 980 (1958); von
Moschzisker, supra note 33, at 3; Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 1038 n.120.
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statute, courts would have presumed that general common law rules
applied in all jurisdictions—just as Field considered the law of
personal jurisdiction to apply in all jurisdictions. But they did not.
The presumption was used only in connection with a jurisdiction
whose legal system was based upon the common law.38 Further-
more, when determining whether a legal system was based upon the
common law, courts would rely upon social facts about the officials
or inhabitants of the jurisdiction.39 
Just which U.S. states were thought to have legal systems suf-
ficiently based upon the common law for the presumption to apply
was a matter of some disagreement. For example, some state courts
would extend the presumption only to a sister state that was one of
the original thirteen colonies or, like Illinois or Tennessee, composed
of territory that belonged to these colonies.40 Concerning other
states these courts would not use the presumption, which meant
that they dismissed the case or employed the presumption of simi-
larity to forum law, including its statutory law.41 Some courts,
however, would extend the presumption to states carved out of
territory acquired after American independence, provided that the
state’s first legal system was a common law system formed by
emigrants from the original states.42 But they did not extend the
presumption to states that had preexisting civil law legal systems,
such as Florida, Texas, and California, even though these states
later passed reception statutes adopting the common law.43 And, of
course, the presumption was not extended to Louisiana,44 which
38. See, e.g., Dempster v. Stephen, 63 Ill. App. 126, 128 (1896); Stewart’s Adm’x. v. Bacon,
70 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Ky. 1934); Waln v. Waln, 22 A. 203, 204-05 (N.J. 1891). 
39. In general, courts took judicial notice of whether a jurisdiction’s legal system was
based on the common law. See, e.g., Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479 (1912);
Castleman v. Jeffries, 60 Ala. 380, 387 (1877); Aslanian v. Dostumian, 54 N.E. 845, 846 (Mass.
1899); In re Hall, 61 A.D. 266, 272-73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901). 
40. E.g., Albert Martin Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 HARV. L. REV. 401, 402-
03 (1906). 
41. See, e.g., Flato v. Mulhall, 72 Mo. 522, 524-25 (1880).
42. See, e.g., Crouch v. Hall, 15 Ill. 264, 266-67 (1853); Bradley v. Peabody Coal Co., 99 Ill.
App. 427, 432-33 (1902); Kales, supra note 40, at 402-04.
43. E.g., Krouse v. Krouse, 95 N.E. 262, 263-64 (Ind. App. 1911); E. B. Hayes Mach. Co.
v. Eastham, 84 So. 898, 899 (La. 1920). See generally Kales, supra note 40, at 406-09.
44. E.g., Int’l Text-Book Co. v. Connelly, 99 N.E. 722, 727 (N.Y. 1912) (“In the absence of
proof on the subject [such as a statute abrogating the common law], however, the common law
is presumed to prevail in all the states in which it is the foundation of their jurisprudence,
such as New York and Pennsylvania, but not including those states which inherited or
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retained a civil law system, or to other civil law jurisdictions, such
as Mexico45 or Germany.46
One might argue, however, that the refusal to extend the
principles of the common law to a civil law state like Louisiana was
compatible with the view that the common law was a brooding
omnipresence. The common law was originally binding in Louisiana,
but with the adoption of a civil law system it had been displaced by
a comprehensive statutory regime. However, courts that refused to
extend the common law to a civil law jurisdiction made it clear that
this was because the jurisdiction’s officials or inhabitants chose not
to adopt the common law, not because they chose to displace the
common law by statute.47 Furthermore, such a reading cannot
explain courts’ refusal to extend common law rules to jurisdictions
that were not based on the common law and lacked a comprehensive
adopted the civil law, such as Louisiana.”).
45. E.g., Banco de Sonora v. Bankers’ Mut. Cas. Co., 100 N.W. 532, 536 (Iowa 1904).
46. In re De Garmendia’s Estate, 125 A. 897, 899 (Md. 1924).
47. See, e.g., Barrielle v. Bettman, 199 F. 838, 840 (S.D. Ohio 1912) (“[I]t will not be
presumed that the English common law is in force in any state or country not settled by
English colonists.”); Savage v. O’Neil, 44 N.Y. 298, 301 (1871) (“Such a presumption is
indulged by our courts only in reference to England and the States which have taken the
common law from England.”).
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statutory regime—such as Native American tribes48—or concerning
which the existence of such a statutory regime was in doubt.49 
Thus, the question of whether the common law was applicable in
a jurisdiction was ultimately a question of social facts about that
jurisdiction. A court adjudicating an event in another jurisdiction
would not come to its own conclusion about a general common law
rule prevailing there unless it had made a threshold determination
—usually unarticulated—that officials in the jurisdiction, or its
inhabitants more generally, had decided to adopt a common law
system. Had the events in Swift occurred in Louisiana or among
members of the Creek Nation, Story would not have thought that
the Supreme Court was empowered to come to its own view about
the prevailing legal rule. The Supreme Court had this power in
Swift only because New Yorkers, by adopting a common law system
48. See, e.g., Davison v. Gibson, 56 F. 443, 444-45 (8th Cir. 1893); Johnson v. State, 30
S.W. 31, 31 (Ark. 1895); Garner v. Wright, 12 S.W. 785, 785 (Ark. 1890); Ark. City Bank v.
Cassidy, 71 Mo. App. 186, 188 (1896). To be sure, the Arkansas cases might be explained away
on the grounds that Arkansas did not adopt a Swiftian view of the general common law,
although the Arkansas Supreme Court took this stand only after the cases were decided. See
J.R. Watkins Med. Co. v. Johnson, 196 S.W. 465, 466 (Ark. 1917). The same might be said of
the Missouri case because Missouri later rejected Swift. See Musser v. Musser, 221 S.W. 46,
48-49 (Mo. 1920); Root v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 92 S.W. 621, 628 (Mo. 1906). But federal courts
accepted Swift, and nevertheless in Davison a federal court did not presume that the common
law applied to events governed by the law of the Creek Nation. Davison, 56 F. at 444. To be
sure, one might argue that Davison concerned a local usage, not the general common law,
because it was about the common law right of a husband to his deceased wife’s property. See
id. at 444; see also Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 413 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 8952)
(holding that the disposition of personal property in a will is “of a local rather than a general
nature”). But the court in Davison relied on the fact that the common law could not be
presumed to apply to an Indian tribe, not that the issue concerned a local usage. See Davison,
56 F. at 444.
Treatment of white settlers in Indian Territory was different. Sometimes courts held that
common law principles should apply to them, even when the transaction being litigated
occurred prior to the Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 31, 26 Stat. 81, 94-95, which extended the
common law to Indian Territory. Huntley v. Kingman, 152 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1894); Eddy v.
Lafayette, 49 F. 798, 799-800 (8th Cir. 1892). Here the applicability of the common law
probably rested upon the settlers’ choice to adopt it as the standard governing their affairs,
although it might be understood as based on the presumption that the law of the forum should
be used in the absence of evidence of applicable law. See, e.g., Pyeatt v. Powell, 51 F. 551, 555
(8th Cir. 1892) (arguing that in federal court the common law should be presumed to prevail
among white settlers in Indian Territory because “the lex fori, or, in other words, the laws of
the country to whose courts the party appeals for redress, furnish in all cases, prima facie, the
rule of decision”).
49. See, e.g., Aslanian v. Dostumian, 54 N.E. 845, 846 (Mass. 1899) (Turkey); Savage, 44
N.Y. at 300 (Russia). 
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for the state, gave the Court that power.50 That means that the law
applied in Swift was New York law. 
But how could Story think he was applying New York law when
he spoke of the “general commercial law” as unrelated to any
particular jurisdiction?51 The reason is that he was not using the
word “law” to refer to the law. He was instead talking about a
common standard identified by a number of jurisdictions’ laws.52
Assume two states—say, Alabama and Mississippi—each chose
to adopt the Bible as binding law within their borders. A positivist
would deny that Alabama and Mississippi have the same law,
because that wrongly suggests that their sovereignty had some-
how merged. For example, under Hart’s theory,53 Alabama and
Mississippi could have the same law only if they shared official
practices of norm enforcement. And that is not true: The Bible is
binding in Alabama due to Alabama practices and is binding in
Mississippi due to Mississippi practices. Although the Bible as a
standard exists independently of any particular jurisdiction, that
does not mean that the Bible as law does.54 
50. See Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 921, 927-28, 979-84 (2013). In arguing that Swift depended upon the view that state
officials had licensed federal courts to come to their own conclusion about the state’s common
law, my reading is contrary to Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of
Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998). Although Goldsmith and Walt also see Swift as
compatible with positivism, under their reading of Swift, federal courts’ power to come to their
own conclusion about the general common law in a state had its source in federal law,
particularly diversity jurisdiction. See id. at 695. Either diversity jurisdiction authorized
federal courts to make an independent judgment about the content of state law, or it gave
federal courts the power to enforce a national common law. See id.; see also Steven Walt,
Before the Jurisprudential Turn: Corbin and the Mid-Century Opposition to Erie, 2 WASH. U.
JURISPRUDENCE REV. 75, 126 (2010). Under both of these readings, a federal court would have
the power to come to its own conclusion about the law in a state whatever the state’s officials
said about the matter. Under my reading, state officials had control over whether federal
courts could come to their own conclusion about the law in the state. By adopting a civil law
system or developing a customary law system not based upon the common law, New York
could have made Swift inapplicable to it. The authority the Supreme Court exercised in Swift
ultimately rested in New York law, not federal law. 
51. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
52. See id. at 18-19.
53. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
54. Even a nonpositivist like Field would agree. Although he would likely claim that
Alabama and Mississippi have the same law of personal jurisdiction, see supra notes 16-22,
he would not say the same thing about the Bible.
858 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:845
The “general commercial law” that Story described was like the
Bible in our example. Although as a standard it existed indepen-
dently of a jurisdiction’s officials, Story recognized that it was the
law in a jurisdiction only because the jurisdiction’s officials or
inhabitants said so.55 His opinion sounds nonpositivist only because
he chose to apply the word “law” to a standard shared by common
law jurisdictions. 
Once the general common law is understood as a shared standard
for common law jurisdictions, rather than some sort of transjur-
isdictional law, a different objection to the Swift regime emerges:
the general common law may not provide meaningful guidance to
private individuals and courts. Someone might object to Alabama’s
and Mississippi’s approach on the same grounds—that is, because
no coherent standard of conduct can be derived from the Bible. 
This criticism would obviously fail if the “general commercial law”
at issue in Swift were commercial custom, because that can provide
a coherent standard of conduct.56 And unless one entertains a form
of ethical antirealism—and perhaps not even then57—the criticism
would also fail if the general common law included moral norms,
because they too can provide courts with meaningful guidance.58 
But the criticism gains more traction if we understand the gen-
eral common law as a standard that does not merely guide the
decisions of common law courts but also depends upon those de-
cisions in a way that permits the standard to evolve over time.59 To
be sure, the standard would be able to provide meaningful guidance
if it were understood as the majority position among common law
55. Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive
Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1790 (1997).
56. See id.
57. See Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY
158 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
58. I describe these incorporated moral norms as the inclusive legal positivist would, that
is, as legal norms. For a description of the exclusive legal positivist approach, see SCOTT J.
SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 267-74 (2011). 
59. For this criticism of the general common law, see Lessig, supra note 55, at 1792;
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV.
395, 428 (1995). Lessig wrongly identifies this criticism as positivist in motivation. Lessig,
supra note 55, at 1793. As we have seen, nothing in positivism keeps one from believing that
such a general common law standard exists. The positivist would simply insist that whether
the standard is legally binding in a particular jurisdiction is dependent upon social facts about
that jurisdiction. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions. Such a standard could evolve if the majority position
changed—although it could do so only due to decisions that,
diverging from the majority, were actually erroneous at the time
they were made. The problem is that courts that were committed to
the general common law apparently did not think they were in error
simply because they were in the minority.60 The general common
law was an odd hybrid—beholden, by and large, to past decisions of
all common law jurisdictions, but also containing normative stan-
dards allowing for proper divergence from such decisions.61
In what follows, I will not take a stand on whether the general
common law can be defended as a meaningful standard. The reason,
as we shall see, is that the question is not essential to the conflict
between Swift and Erie. An Erie approach can be appropriate for a
state that accepts the general common law, even when one assumes
that the general common law is a meaningful standard. Conversely,
a Swift approach can still be appropriate for a jurisdiction that
rejects the general common law. 
II. DARK MATTER IN SWIFT AND ERIE
To see why this is so, let us begin by assuming that the general
common law is a meaningful standard of conduct and adjudication.
New York officials, in choosing to become a common law jurisdic-
tion, decided that this standard should be binding in New York. The
standard is objective in the sense that it is not reducible to the
decisions of New York courts. They can be wrong about what the
general common law is. Given that New York officials think the
general common law is objective, does it follow that they licensed
federal and sister state courts to come to their own conclusion about
the general common law when adjudicating events in New York? 
Justice Story apparently thought so. The issue in Swift, as he put
it, was “whether it is obligatory upon this Court [to follow a New
60. See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263,
281-84 (1992). This aspect of common law adjudication is an abiding theme in the work of
Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176-275 (1986); cf. Nelson, supra
note 28, at 510 n.35 (“[T]he fact that most states have rejected a particular legal rule will not
necessarily keep the relevant Restatement from embracing it.”).
61. Similar problems can occur when federal positive law refers to general legal rules that
are distilled from the legal practices of many jurisdictions. See Nelson, supra note 28, at 519-
25.
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York decision], if it differs from the principles established in the
general commercial law.”62 The following was his response: “It is
observable that the Courts of New York do not found their decisions
upon this point upon any local statute, or positive, fixed, or ancient
local usage[;] but they deduce the doctrine from the general
principles of commercial law.”63 Story’s point appears to be this:
given that New York courts think that the general commercial law
transcends the interpretations provided by New York courts, why
would they want their interpretations to bind federal and sister
state courts? Surely they want these other courts to look to the
general commercial law too. To claim that New York courts’ inter-
pretations bind federal and sister state courts would change the
nature of the common law in New York. It would become whatever
New York courts say it is. And New York courts themselves do not
think that is true. Having chosen a standard that transcends the
decisions of New York courts, it follows that New York courts, as
well as other New York officials, would want federal and sister state
courts to look to the transjurisdictional standard rather than New
York decisions when adjudicating events arising in New York.
But Story’s argument fails. To see why, consider a different prob-
lem: whether federal and sister state courts should respect a con-
crete judgment—say, that Tyson is not liable to Swift—made by a
New York state court in a general common law case. Because the
general common law is objective, New York officials would accept
the possibility that the court issuing the judgment misinterpreted
the general common law. Did it follow that federal and sister courts
were free to ignore the judgment? 
The answer is clearly no. The purpose of judgments, after all, is
to settle concrete disputes. New York state courts had to respect a
New York judgment, unless it was overturned on appeal, even when
the court that issued the judgment misinterpreted the general
common law. It is entirely possible that New York officials wanted
federal and sister state courts to have the same duty to respect
erroneous New York judgments that New York state courts had.64
62. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
63. Id.
64. The question addressed here is whether New York officials wanted federal and sister
state courts to respect the New York state court judgment. I set aside the question of whether
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Like concrete judgments, interpretations of the general common
law by the New York Court of Appeals were also intended to settle
disagreements.65 Their effect was greater, however, for they were
binding on lower New York state courts in any case where the
interpretive issue arose.66 They had this binding effect even though
New York officials thought the general common law standard
transcended the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals. Its
decisions were binding even when they were in error. 
Given that official commitment to the objectivity of the general
common law did not keep these decisions from binding lower New
York courts, it is possible that they were meant to bind federal and
sister state courts as well. Justice Story’s mistake in Swift was
assuming that he could draw conclusions about the extrajuris-
dictional effect of New York decisions from the fact that New York
officials accepted a legal standard that transcended those decisions.
But critics of Swift, such as Justice Holmes, made the opposite
error, for they assumed that they could draw conclusions about the
extrajurisdictional effect of decisions by the New York Court of
Appeals from the fact that the decisions were binding on lower New
York state courts:
If a state constitution should declare that on all matters of
general law the decisions of the highest Court should establish
the law until modified by statute or by a later decision of the
same Court, I do not perceive how it would be possible for a
Court of the United States to refuse to follow what the State
Court decided in that domain. But when the constitution of a
federal and sister state courts are constitutionally obligated to respect New York officials’
views. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, sister state courts would, with a small number
of exceptions, have such a constitutional obligation. E.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230,
237 (1908). The obligations of federal courts, however, are statutory only. 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(2006).
65. In fact, at the time that Swift was decided, the highest court of appeal in New York
was the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Error, “a hybrid composed
of the state Senators sitting with the justices of the Supreme Court of Judicature (‘N.Y.
Supreme Court’) (when hearing writs of appeal in equity) or the Chancellor (when hearing
writs of error at law).” R. Kirkland Cozine, The Emergence of Written Appellate Briefs in the
Nineteenth Century United States, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 482, 511 (1994). It was replaced by
the current Court of Appeals by the New York Constitution of 1846. Id. For ease of exposition,
I ignore these historical details here.
66. E.g., Hanford v. Artcher, 4 Hill 271, 322-25 (N.Y. 1842); Costello v. Syracuse,
Binghamton & N.Y. R.R. Co., 65 Barb. 92, 100 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1873).
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State establishes a Supreme Court it by implication does make
that declaration as clearly as if it had said it in express words,
so far as it is not interfered with by the superior power of the
United States. The Supreme Court of a State does something
more than make a scientific inquiry into a fact outside of and
independent of it. It says, with an authority that no one denies
... that thus the law is and shall be.67
Holmes is correct that interpretations of the general common law by
the New York Court of Appeals are not simply a form of scientific
inquiry. They are meant to settle disagreements for lower New York
state courts. But it does not follow that when federal and sister
state courts adjudicate events in New York, they are also bound by
its decisions. Whether they are bound is a contingent question of
New York law.
Of course, Holmes’s argument would work if the legal standard of
conduct prevailing in New York simply was what the Court of
Appeals said it was. Holmes suggests this, for he speaks of decisions
of the highest court of appeals as establishing the law, not settling
disagreements about the law. But that is not what New York offi-
cials thought at the time. Holmes’s argument is influenced by the
fallacy—common among legal realists—that the legal standard of
conduct in a jurisdiction must be equivalent to binding interpre-
tations of that standard. The New York Court of Appeals, he
assumes, cannot be wrong about New York law. 
But that cannot be true, for if it were, one would have to conclude
that because judgments by New York courts are binding, they
cannot be wrong about New York law either. To be sure, many legal
realists bit the bullet and said just that: 
For any particular lay person, the law, with respect to any
particular set of facts, is a decision of a court with respect to
those facts so far as that decision affects that particular person.
Until a court has passed on those facts no law on that subject is
yet in existence. Prior to such a decision, the only law available
is the opinion of lawyers as to the law relating to that person
67. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 534-35 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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and to those facts. Such opinion is not actually law but only a
guess as to what a court will decide.68
But few New York officials would accept this notion even today,
much less at the time Swift was decided. They would think that a
judgment can be binding despite being in error. The judgment does
not change the prevailing legal rule, even in the case to which the
judgment applies. 
There is no a priori reason, therefore, why New York officials did
not think that an interpretation of the general common law by the
New York Court of Appeals could be in error, despite the fact that
it was binding on lower New York state courts. And given that they
considered the legal standard to be independent of the New York
Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the standard, they might have
chosen to release federal and sister state courts from any duty to
respect the interpretation.69
Indeed, because the extrajurisdictional effect of state court de-
cisions is a contingent matter of state law, nothing about a Swiftian
approach requires the general common law. Although New York
officials are no longer committed to the general common law, they
still might adopt Swift by licensing federal and sister state courts to
come to their own conclusion about the common law in the state. 
For example, in Basso v. Miller the New York Court of Appeals
held that the common law duty of care to trespassers is a negligence
standard.70 Although it did not look to the general common law
when justifying its decision, it did take into account moral, eco-
68. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 50 (Anchor Books 1963) (1930); see also
id. at 137, 297. For a discussion, see Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1926-36 (2005). 
69. But what if the general common law standard was simply unable to provide anyone
with meaningful guidance? Would it not follow then that federal and sister state courts must
defer to the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals? Because the question is one of state
law, we must ask what the state’s officials would say about the matter. Consider, for example,
what Alabama officials would think federal and sister state courts should do if the Bible fails
to provide a meaningful standard of conduct. Maybe they would think those courts should
follow the decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court. But because those decisions were based
on the idea that the Bible was a meaningful standard, Alabama officials might instead
conclude that federal and sister state courts should simply come to their own view about what
Alabama law should be. Here too, no a priori conclusions about extrajurisdictional effect are
possible.
70. 352 N.E.2d 868, 871-72 (N.Y. 1976).
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nomic, and social considerations.71 Its decision is binding on lower
New York state courts even if it got these considerations wrong. It
remains conceivable, however, that New York officials think that
the objective considerations mentioned in Basso determine the
legally applicable standard of conduct in New York—that is, that
Basso, despite being binding on lower New York courts, could be
wrong about New York law. If that is so, they might also want
federal and sister state courts to ignore Basso and look to the legally
applicable standard when adjudicating events in New York.
Whether they have this view is a contingent question of New York
law.
To sum up, Swift and Erie are best understood as different ac-
counts of state law. According to Swift, a state’s officials do not
intend the state supreme court’s decisions about the general com-
mon law to be binding beyond the state court system. According to
Erie, state officials think the state supreme court’s decisions bind
federal and sister state courts when adjudicating events within the
state. Either account could be correct. The question cannot be
answered on the basis of a priori reasoning from the fact that state
officials are committed to an objective legal standard or from the
fact that state supreme court decisions are binding on lower state
courts. 
Although a priori reasoning cannot justify Erie, one might argue
that it was the more plausible interpretation of state law, even
when states were committed to the general common law, because
Swift made it difficult for someone within a state to be sure what
interpretation of the general common law might be applied to his
conduct. But the general common law governed only transactions
that tended to cross state borders.72 It did not apply to issues that
were “immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and char-
acter.”73 For this reason, expectations were arguably weaker in gen-
eral common law cases. New York officials might have thought that
federal and sister state courts’ freedom to collaborate in developing
the general common law standard was more important than
respecting any expectations the parties might have.
71. Id.
72. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
73. Id.
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Can we get any evidence in favor of Swift or Erie from state court
decisions themselves? The problem is finding a situation in which
a New York state court would have a concrete reason to opine about
whether federal and sister state courts have a duty to look to New
York decisions when deciding a general common law case that arose
in New York. Such a situation would not arise when New York
courts were considering whether they should enforce a federal or
sister state judgment concerning an event in New York. Full faith
and credit would require New York state courts to respect the
judgment even if the rendering court misapplied the law.74 To be
sure, New York state courts might say they disagreed with the
rendering court’s decision.75 But they would have no reason to speak
about whether the rendering court was violating its obligations
under New York law. 
We face the problem of dark matter. Notice that the situation is
different with respect to federal law. Imagine that state courts take
their obligations under the Supremacy Clause seriously but think
that the United States Supreme Court does not intend its interpre-
tations of federal law to bind them. If they ignore its interpretations,
the Supreme Court can take the matter on appeal and make the
extrajurisdictional effect of its interpretations clear.76 But in general
common law cases, there was no avenue of appeal from a federal or
sister state court to the supreme court of the state where the cause
of action arose.
The absence of decisions about extrajurisdictional effect from the
state courts themselves led both Swift and Erie to devolve into
general approaches—applicable to all common law jurisdictions.
Although extrajurisdictional effect was a question of state law that
74. See, e.g., McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 324-28 (1839);
Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818); Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
481, 484-85 (1813); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 609 (photo.
reprint 1979) (1834). For a discussion of state court treatment of federal judgments, see
Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal
Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 763 (1986); Ronan E. Degnan,
Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 744 & n.17 (1976); Howard M. Erichson,
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 989 (1998).
75. Cf. Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill 93 (N.Y. 1843) (disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation in Swift).
76. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958) (holding that agents of the state of
Arkansas were bound by the Court’s prior decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), requiring racial desegregation in public schools).
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ideally should have been answered on a state-by-state basis, there
was no information to give the forum a reason to deviate from the
presumptive interpretation.
One might argue that the approach that a state supreme court
took toward general common law cases arising in sister states was
evidence of how it wanted its own decisions to be treated.77 If it
ignored sister state decisions, that indicated that it did not think its
own decisions were binding on federal or sister state courts.78 An
example is Georgia, whose supreme court affirmed a Swiftian ap-
proach in Slaton v. Hall, only nine years before Erie was decided:
The common law is presumed to be the same in all the American
states where it prevails. Though courts in the different states
may place a different construction upon a principle of common
law, that does not change the law. There is still only one right
construction. If all the American states were to construe the
same principle of common law incorrectly, the common law
would be unchanged.79
Although Slaton concerned whether a Georgia state court could
ignore Alabama decisions when determining the content of the
common law in Alabama, the Georgia Supreme Court’s reasoning
suggests that it thought its own common law decisions should not
bind federal or sister state courts when adjudicating events arising
in Georgia.80
Conversely, even before Erie was decided, some states rejected
Swift. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court put it in Forepaugh v.
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co.: 
It is not probable that the doctrine [of the general common
law] would ever have got a foothold in jurisprudence, and it
would certainly have been long ago abandoned, had it not been
for the unfortunate misstep that was made in the opinion in
[Swift]. Since then the courts of the United States have persisted
in the recognition of a mythical commercial law, and have
77. Green, supra note 27, at 1123-27.
78. For a discussion, see id. at 1121-24.
79. 148 S.E. 741, 743 (Ga. 1929). Indeed, apparently Georgia still has this approach.
Green, supra note 27, at 1126-27 & n.89.
80. See Slaton, 148 S.E. at 743-44.
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professed to decide so-called commercial questions by it, in
entire disregard of the law of the state where the question
arose.81
Although Forepaugh concerned whether a Pennsylvania state court
should follow New York decisions when determining the content of
the common law in New York, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
reasoning suggests that it thought its own common law decisions
should bind federal and sister state courts when adjudicating events
arising in Pennsylvania.82
Strictly speaking, however, Slaton and Forepaugh solely ad-
dressed the binding effect of sister state decisions, not the extraju-
risdictional effect of the court’s own decisions.83 Absent certification,
state supreme courts would have no reason to settle the matter.
Thus, although I am reasonably confident that Slaton and
Forepaugh indicate the views of each state supreme court about its
own decisions, the absence of authoritative pronouncements on the
matter makes it understandable that Swift and Erie ended up as
general, rather than state-by-state, methods. 
What is more, if courts were to adopt a state-by-state method, in
which they looked to a state supreme court’s general approach to
sister states’ common law decisions to determine the extrajuris-
dictional effect of the state supreme court’s own decisions, the
exercise would be self-defeating. Once state supreme courts them-
selves adopted such a method, they would no longer have general
approaches, and the evidence of their views about their own de-
cisions would evaporate.
One might argue that since the 1960s, the choice between Swift
and Erie has been answered through certification, and the response
has been Erie.84 Federal and sister state courts have certified
questions to state supreme courts concerning the state’s common
law, including issues that would have been designated as general at
the time of Swift.85 If the state supreme courts thought their
81. 18 A. 503, 505 (Pa. 1889).
82. See id. at 506.
83. See Lea Brilmayer, A Reply, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 136, 140-
41 (Donald Earl Childress III ed., 2012).
84. See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and
Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1545-49 (1997).
85. See id. at 1544.
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decisions were not binding extrajurisdictionally, surely they would
have rejected the certification.86 
Granted, the questions certified probably concerned how the state
supreme court would rule, not whether its ruling would bind the
court requesting certification—although that question could, of
course, be certified as well. The courts requesting certification might
have legitimate reasons to want to know what the state supreme
court would say, despite the fact that they were not bound by its
decision.87 But even if certification has shown Erie to be correct, at
the time Erie was decided the question was still open. And thus Erie
was as much a guess about the extrajurisdictional effect of state
supreme court decisions as Swift was.88 
86. Even the Georgia Supreme Court has taken certified questions about Georgia common
law, e.g., Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 481 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. 1997), which
suggests that it has in fact abandoned its Swiftian view of the common law, despite failing to
overrule Slaton. Green, supra note 27, at 1126-27.
87. For example, if the question is one of forum state law, a federal court might have a
reason to decide as the forum state’s supreme court would, simply to serve the twin aims of
Erie, that is, to avoid forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws. See
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). For the argument that the twin aims are
motivated by federal interests rather than respect for state lawmaking authority, see Michael
Steven Green, In Defense of the Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming
2013).
88. In my argument above, I have assumed that the extrajurisdictional effect of state
supreme court decisions is up to the state’s officials and thus that the appropriateness of
adopting Swift or Erie can be answered only by reference to state law. I have argued
elsewhere, however, that Erie might be justified on the basis of a constitutionally mandated
antidiscrimination principle that prohibits a state from releasing federal and sister state
courts from the duty to defer to the state supreme court’s decisions, unless it is willing to
release lower state courts from the same duty. Green, supra note 27. Georgia might be
constitutionally prohibited from freeing federal and sister state courts from the duty to
respect the Georgia Supreme Court’s decisions, as it apparently tried to do in Slaton, unless
it was willing to free lower Georgia state courts from the same duty. Id. at 1145-47. 
I will not discuss in this Article the extent to which such a strategy can succeed. A
complicating factor is that even if such a duty of nondiscrimination exists, a state is certainly
permitted to free federal and sister state courts of any duty to use its procedure when
entertaining its causes of action. Id. at 1150-54. The fact that Georgia state courts must use
the state’s service rules when entertaining Georgia actions does not mean that federal and
sister state courts must do so as well. For a constitutional argument against Swift to succeed,
therefore, we need to show that a state may not legitimately treat the interpretations of the
common law by its supreme court as procedural rules. See id. at 1151.
2013] LAW’S DARK MATTER 869
III. DARK MATTER AND THE LAW OF CHOICE OF LAW
Because problems of dark matter have not gone away, neither has
the conflict between Swift and Erie. But the focus has shifted from
whether a state supreme court’s interpretations of the common law
are binding extrajurisdictionally to the extrajurisdictional effect of
other state rules—or, as it is sometimes put, whether these rules
are substantive or procedural. Although these questions are occa-
sionally certified to the relevant state supreme court,89 the forum
generally must approach the matter in the absence of any state
court decisions on point. 
A recent example is Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate
Insurance Co.90 The issue in Shady Grove was whether section
901(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law, which prohibits claims
for statutory damages from being brought as class actions, should
be used by a federal court in New York sitting in diversity when
considering the certification of a class in which the plaintiffs’ actions
were for statutory damages under New York law.91 The disagree-
ment between Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg was driven
largely by a question of dark matter—that is, whether New York
officials intended section 901(b) to be substantive, in the sense of
following New York statutory damages actions into other court sys-
tems.92 Because the legislative history was compatible with either
a procedural or a substantive reading,93 Ginsburg, who argued that
the rule was substantive, was forced to look for evidence in New
York cases.94 The results were predictable: no New York state court
had ever addressed the question. 
A good deal of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion focused on whether New
York state courts had applied section 901(b) to causes of action
89. E.g., Baxter v. Sturm Ruger & Co., 644 A.2d 1297, 1298 (Conn. 1994).
90. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
91. Id. at 1436-37.
92. See id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, in contrast, argued that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governed the matter, even if section 901(b) was
substantive. Id. at 1442-43 (majority opinion). 
93. Compare id. at 1440-42 (majority opinion), and id. at 1457-59 (Stevens, J., concurring),
with id. at 1464-65, 1469-72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1464-65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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under federal or sister state law.95 Although she argued that they
had not done so,96 she ignored cases in which New York state courts
had treated section 901(b) as prima facie applicable to federal
causes of action, including actions under federal securities and civil
rights law and the Truth in Lending Act.97 To apply to federal
causes of action, section 901(b) must be procedural. It could not
apply beyond New York courts because New York cannot tell federal
or sister state courts when federal statutory damages actions can be
brought as class actions.98
95. Id. at 1470-73.
96. See id. at 1470-71. A particular problem was that New York state courts had applied
section 901(b) to federal actions under the Federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006). See Rudgayzer & Gratt v. Cape Canaveral Tour & Travel,
Inc., 799 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 2005), cited in Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1470 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). In response, Ginsburg noted that the TCPA has an unusual provision
authorizing TCPA actions in state court “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of the
court of [the] State.” Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1470 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 47
U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)). This provision did not just refer to state procedure but also to the relevant
state substantive law. See Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 342 (2d Cir. 2006). Thus,
she argued, New York state courts applied section 901(b) to TCPA actions not because they
considered section 901(b) procedural but because they thought it was substantive New York
law that had been incorporated into the TCPA. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1470-71 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). In fact, Ginsburg ignored that New York courts had apparently not understood
the TCPA as incorporating state substantive law. They applied section 901(b) to TCPA actions
because they considered section 901(b) procedural. E.g., Rudgayzer, 799 N.Y.S.2d at 799
(appealing to “the importance of state control of state judicial procedure”). As one New York
court baldly put it, “[T]he New York Civil Practice Law and Rules are procedural in nature,
and therefore the CPLR § 901 governing class actions is controlling as to whether plaintiff has
a valid class action in this [TCPA] case.” Giovanniello v. Hispanic Media Grp. USA, 780
N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
97. In these cases the courts ultimately concluded that section 901(b) did not apply. But
the reason was not that it was substantive and therefore applicable only to actions under New
York law. It was because the damages at issue were not penalties, Pruitt v. Rockefeller Ctr.
Props., 574 N.Y.S.2d 672, 679-80 (App. Div. 1991) (federal securities law not a penalty); Felder
v. Foster, 421 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (App. Div. 1979) (federal civil rights damages not a penalty),
or because federal law had preempted New York state procedure on the availability of class
actions, Vickers v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 390 N.Y.S.2d 747, 748 (App. Div. 1977)
(permitting class action under Truth in Lending Act because federal statute “‘expressly
contemplate[d]’ class actions”).
98. In fact, the matter is somewhat more complicated than this. New York cannot tell
sister state and federal courts whether federal statutory damages actions can be brought as
class actions by appealing to a power to define the cause of action. But it might extend section
901(b) to them by virtue of some other connection with the case, for example, because the
defendant was a New York domiciliary. However, such a reading of section 901(b) is very
implausible.
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But these cases are far from fatal. It always remains possible that
section 901(b) created two rules—one procedural and the other
substantive. Section 901(b) might apply in New York state courts to
all actions for statutory damages, including actions under the law
of other sovereigns, and follow New York statutory damages actions
into other court systems. A substantive reading of section 901(b)
cannot be excluded because New York state courts have never had
occasion to decide the matter. Without certification, the question is
completely speculative. In the end, Ginsburg was reduced to
pointing to a Connecticut state court decision that applied section
901(b) to causes of action that arose in New York as evidence that
section 901(b) was substantive.99 What else could she do? At least
the Connecticut court had a reason to talk about the issue.
In the remainder of this Article, I would like to focus on another
problem of dark matter that has inspired a Swiftian approach and
an Erie response—the extrajurisdictional effect of a state’s choice-of-
law rules. To set up the problem, I will begin with recent arguments
in favor of an Erie approach offered by Kermit Roosevelt.
Assume that a Vermont state court is entertaining a negligence
action brought by a New York wife against her New York husband
concerning an accident in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania law forbids
interspousal suits, but New York law allows them. Which law
should the Vermont court use? 
Roosevelt argues that this question needs to be broken down into
two steps.100 The first is determining “which of the potentially
relevant laws grant rights to the parties.”101 Here the question is
whether New York and Pennsylvania law actually extend to the
facts of the case. To answer this question, the court must look to
what Roosevelt calls “rules of scope.”102 If these rules say that only
one state’s law applies, then the court faces what Brainerd Currie
called a “false conflict,”103 and that state’s law should be used. If two
99. Weber v. U.S. Sterling Sec., 924 A.2d 816, 826-27 (Conn. 2007), cited in Shady Grove,
130 S. Ct. at 1471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100. Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means
of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1871 (2005).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. BRAINERD CURRIE, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 77, 107, 109 (1963) (initially using the phrase
“false problem”); Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U.
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or more states’ laws apply, the court faces a “true conflict” and must
use a “rule of priority” to decide between them.104
Following arguments originally offered by Lea Brilmayer and
Larry Kramer, Roosevelt argues that the relevant rules of scope are
provided by the choice-of-law rules of the state whose law is at
issue.105 Thus, the Vermont court should look to Pennsylvania’s
choice-of-law rules to find the rules of scope that determine whether
Pennsylvania law extends to the facts. It cannot use Pennsylvania
law unless the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, applying Pennsylva-
nia’s choice-of-law rules, would say that Pennsylvania law applies.106
In short, Roosevelt argues that some of Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law
rules have extrajurisdictional effect. They follow Pennsylvania
causes of action into other court systems.
But Roosevelt argues that the Vermont court is not bound by
those Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules that are rules of priority.107
Assume that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined,
through its own rules of scope, that Pennsylvania law applies to the
facts and, through New York’s rules of scope, that New York law
also applies. That the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would favor a
Pennsylvania right over a New York right—or a New York right
CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (1989).
104. Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 1871.
105. Id. at 1872-74. Lea Brilmayer is probably the first modern conflicts scholar to make
the argument. See Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A
Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REV. 555, 560-61 (1984). For Larry Kramer’s version, see Larry
Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 303-04 (1990) [hereinafter
Kramer, Rethinking]; Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979 (1991)
[hereinafter Kramer, Renvoi]. 
106. See Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 1874. The approach recommended by Brilmayer,
Kramer, and Roosevelt should be distinguished from the doctrine of “renvoi” in choice of law.
Under renvoi, if the forum’s choice-of-law rules recommend sister state law, “sister state law”
is taken to mean the law that the sister state’s courts would choose, using the sister state’s
choice-of-law rules. Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 105, at 980 n.3. Thus, if Vermont had a
choice-of-law rule recommending Pennsylvania law, the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would use New York law means that the Vermont court should use New York law.
Under the doctrine we are speaking of here, the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would use New York law means only that the Vermont court cannot use Pennsylvania law.
If a French term must be used, the most appropriate would not be renvoi, but désistement.
E.g., In re Tallmadge, 181 N.Y.S. 336, 344-48 (Sur. Ct. 1919). For a further discussion of the
doctrine of désistement, which was apparently also held by the German conflict scholar Carl
Ludwig von Bar, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of
Laws—Meaning of “The Law of a Country,” 27 YALE L.J. 509, 512-18 (1918). 
107. See Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 1874. 
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over a Pennsylvania right—does not mean that the Vermont court
must do the same. Pennsylvania’s rules of priority do not have
extrajurisdictional effect.
If adopted, Roosevelt’s Erie approach to choice of law would be
revolutionary, for states’ current approach is Swiftian. Consider the
traditional choice-of-law approach, as exemplified in the First
Restatement, which a number of states still use.108 Under this
approach, the forum can apply the law of a sister state even when
the courts of the sister state would not.109 For example, in Rhee v.
Combined Enterprises, a Maryland court, using the First Restate-
ment, applied New Jersey law, which allowed interspousal suits, to
a Maryland couple who got into an accident in New Jersey.110 It did
so even though the New Jersey Supreme Court, using a modern
interest-analysis approach, had held in Veazey v. Doremus that New
Jersey law on interspousal suits should not be applied to nondomi-
ciliaries who get into accidents in New Jersey.111
Of course, Roosevelt would not object to the Maryland court’s
decision in Rhee if the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in
Veazey rested on a rule of priority rather than a rule of scope. But
the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to apply New Jersey law in
Veazey because it thought New Jersey lacked an interest in legally
regulating interspousal suits by nondomiciliaries.112 And Roosevelt
argues that this amounts to a claim that New Jersey law does not
apply to the facts. According to Roosevelt, therefore, the Maryland
court in Rhee acted improperly because it made a claim about the
territorial scope of New Jersey law in defiance of binding decisions
of the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
Modern approaches to choice of law are equally Swiftian.
Although they can take a variety of forms—from the classical
108. As of 2008, states still using the traditional lex loci delicti rule for torts are Alabama,
Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts in 2008:
Twenty-Second Annual Survey, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 269, 279-80 tbl.1 (2009). 
109. The forum ignores the choice-of-law rules of foreign jurisdictions, except in cases of
title to land and the validity of a decree of divorce. PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 163
n.2, 167 n.4 (2010). In these two situations, the doctrine of renvoi is used. Id.
110. 536 A.2d 1197, 1197, 1203 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
111. 510 A.2d 1187, 1191 (N.J. 1986).
112. Id. at 1190.
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interest analysis approach of Brainerd Currie,113 to the Second
Restatement,114 to Leflar’s choice-influencing considerations,115 to
Baxter’s comparative impairment116—all modern approaches take
seriously the idea of looking to the purposes standing behind a
state’s law when determining whether it applies to an event that
crosses state borders. But, like the First Restatement, modern ap-
proaches can conclude that sister state law applies even when the
sister state’s supreme court would say that it does not.117 For
example, in Osborn v. Kinnington the Texas Court of Appeals, using
the Second Restatement, applied Alabama tort law to an accident
between two Alabama co-employees who got into a truck accident in
Texas.118 The defendant pointed to Powell v. Sappington, in which
the Alabama Supreme Court, using the traditional approach, had
refused to apply Alabama tort law to Alabamans who got into an
accident in another state.119 The case was considered irrelevant.120
Once again, Roosevelt would object to Osborn only if the Alabama
Supreme Court’s refusal to use Alabama law in Powell was based on
113. CURRIE, supra note 103; Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the
Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171. No state explicitly adopts all of Currie’s approach,
although all modern approaches are heavily influenced by it.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). This is the most prevalent
approach, used by twenty-four states for torts as of 2008. Symeonides, supra note 108, at 279-
80 tbl.1.
115. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966). This approach, also known as the “better law” approach, is used
by Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin for torts. Symeonides,
supra note 108, at 279-80 tbl.1.
116. William A. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963).
Baxter’s approach is arguably used in California. See Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d
719, 723 (Cal. 1976); Symeonides, supra note 108, at 279.
117. Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 1881; see also Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 105, at 1003-
12. Occasionally modern courts do take the choice-of-law decisions of sister state courts into
account when deciding whether sister state law should be used, but this is generally done in
a haphazard fashion without any appreciation that choice-of-law rules might be substantive.
See, e.g., Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Grp., Inc., 659 A.2d 1295, 1298-99 (Md. 1995);
Lommen v. City of E. Grand Forks, 522 N.W.2d 148, 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Griggs v.
Riley, 489 S.W.2d 469, 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). Currie, for example, recommended that sister
state choice-of-law rules be considered only by a disinterested forum state to resolve cases in
which multiple sister states are deemed to be interested. Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested
Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 781-82 (1963).
118. 787 S.W.2d 417, 418-19 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
119. 495 So. 2d 569, 570 (Ala. 1986), cited in Osborn, 787 S.W.2d at 419.
120. See Osborn, 787 S.W.2d at 419-20.
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a rule of scope rather than a rule of priority. But he reads the First
Restatement as concerning scope.121 According to Roosevelt, the
Texas court in Osborn acted improperly because it made a claim
about the scope of Alabama law in defiance of binding decisions of
the Alabama Supreme Court.122 
In recommending that the current Swiftian approach to choice of
law be replaced by Erie, Roosevelt adopts a particular view about
the extrajurisdictional effect of state supreme courts’ choice-of-law
decisions, according to which some—the ones he calls “rules of
scope”—are intended to bind sister state and federal courts.123 But
what reason do we have to believe that this interpretation is cor-
rect? 
Curiously, Roosevelt treats the matter as beyond the control of
the state supreme court itself:
[I]f the courts of a foreign state would find that no rights exist
under foreign law, the forum cannot disregard that fact. State
courts, after all, are authoritative with respect to their own law,
and the scope of foreign law is not a question of forum law. No
state, for instance, has the power to disregard an explicit
restriction on the scope of another state’s statute (as, for
instance, a provision allowing recovery only for wrongful death
“caused in this state”), and it has no more power to disregard
restrictions imposed by that state’s court of last resort.124
121. Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 1878-79. Kramer claims they are rules of priority. See
Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 105, at 1042-43. The fact that they cannot agree is not surprising,
because the issue concerns dark matter.
122. See Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 1882. Indeed, modern state courts ignore sister state
choice-of-law decisions when determining the territorial scope of sister state law, even when
the sister state has a modern choice-of-law approach. The modern approach tends to treat
state interests as objective—in the sense that they should be determined on the basis of a
rational reading of a state’s laws, independent of the decisions of the state’s courts. Herma
Hill Kay, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REV. 551, 589 n.31 (1968) (“The mere fact
that Ohio might mistakenly fail to recognize her own legitimate interests need not prevent
California from recognizing her interests on her behalf, at least when to do so will not defeat
any opposing interest of [another state with contacts].”); see Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law:
Interest Analysis and Its “New Crits,” 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 681, 686-87 (1988). For a discussion,
see Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 105, at 1003-05. 
123. See Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 1871.
124. Id. at 1872-73 (footnote omitted). 
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Notice that Roosevelt does not say that the forum can disregard a
state’s rule of scope only if this is permitted under the state’s law. He
claims that the forum cannot disregard the state’s rule period—
apparently even if the state wants to release the forum of this duty.
If the New Jersey Supreme Court, using a modern approach, says
that it is not interested, a Maryland court may not use New Jersey
law, even if New Jersey officials want to give the Maryland court
that freedom.
Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court can easily circumvent
the limitation that Roosevelt puts on it. If it thinks that New Jersey
is not interested but wants to allow federal and sister state courts
to use New Jersey law anyway, all it has to do is say that New
Jersey is “interested” and that its disinclination to use New Jersey
law is due to a “rule of priority” rather than a “rule of scope.” But
why force it to invoke such talismanic formulas? Why not simply say
that, interest or no interest, the New Jersey Supreme Court—and
other appropriate New Jersey officials—are the ultimate authorities
on the extrajurisdictional effect of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
choice-of-law decisions, even when the decisions concern the terri-
torial scope of New Jersey law?
I think that the reason Roosevelt does not adopt this approach is
the following: Channeling Holmes, he thinks that the scope of New
Jersey law simply cannot outstrip binding interpretations of that
law by the New Jersey Supreme Court.125 As he puts it, “[U]nless
they run afoul of constitutional restrictions, states cannot be
‘mistaken’ about the scope of their law.”126 The scope of New Jersey
law, he suggests, simply is what the New Jersey Supreme Court
says it is. Having settled the question of territorial scope for lower
New Jersey courts, the New Jersey Supreme Court has established
its territorial scope for all courts, and so it cannot coherently license
federal and sister state courts to come to a different conclusion
about the matter.
As we have seen, however, this is a fallacy. The territorial scope
of New Jersey law is what the New Jersey Supreme Court says it is
only if the New Jersey Supreme Court or other appropriate New
Jersey officials say so. One cannot draw a priori conclusions about
125. See supra text accompanying note 67.
126. Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 1856.
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the extrajurisdictional effect of state supreme court interpretations
of the state’s law from the fact that they are binding on lower state
courts. The extrajurisdictional effect of state supreme court de-
cisions must be answered, not by a priori reasoning, but by refer-
ence to the views of officials within the state.127 
The same point is true of rules of priority. Roosevelt argues that
a state cannot extend its rules of priority to other court systems:
“[W]hile one state’s determination as to the scope of its law must
—as a question of that state’s law—be respected in foreign courts,
its resolution of conflicts between its law and the laws of other
states commands no such deference.”128 Assume, for example, that
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Veazey had admitted that New
Jersey has an interest in applying its law, but ultimately concluded
that the sister state’s interest should be preferred. According to
Roosevelt, this would permit federal and sister state courts to apply
New Jersey law to such cases, whatever the New Jersey Supreme
Court or other New Jersey officials say about the matter.
127. I have concentrated on Roosevelt’s argument for an Erie approach to choice of law
because the parallels with Holmes’s argument are strongest. But Kramer sometimes appears
to offer similar a priori arguments that a state supreme court’s decisions about the scope of
its law must bind federal and sister state courts because they bind lower state courts. Kramer,
Renvoi, supra note 105, at 1030 (“Because this is a question of Illinois positive law, and
because Illinois courts are the authoritative expositors of that law, the Michigan court is
bound to follow Illinois decisions.”); id. at 1011 (“A state’s approach to choice of law by
definition establishes the state’s rules of interpretation for questions of extraterritorial
scope.”); id. at 1028-29. The following is another example:
A state’s approach to choice of law establishes the state’s rules of interpretation
for questions of extraterritorial scope. But interpretation makes law: once
interpreted, it is as if a law expressly said what the court has construed it to say.
There is, however, no general common law of interpretation. Each state is free
to adopt whatever rules of interpretation it deems appropriate, and these rules
are themselves part of the state’s positive law. Consequently, a court in one
state cannot ignore another state’s rules of interpretation in interpreting the
other state’s laws.
Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 105, at 303.
But these passages probably do not reflect Kramer’s considered view. When arguing that
a state’s rules of priority do not bind sister state and federal courts, he does not rely on a
priori reasoning about the nature of law, but instead attempts to discern the likely intent of
the state’s officials. See infra text accompanying notes 145-50. This suggests that he thinks
the extrajurisdictional effect of a state’s rules of scope is likewise a contingent question of
state law.
128. Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 1874; see also Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 105, at 1029
(“No state’s rule has a privileged status from this multilateral perspective.”).
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Once again, this restriction is easy enough for the New Jersey
Supreme Court to circumvent. If it thinks New Jersey has an
interest but wants that interest to be subordinated to sister states’
interests, even by federal and sister state courts, all it has to do is
say the magic words: “New Jersey has no interest.” But why make
it do that? Why not simply say that, interest or no interest, the
extrajurisdictional effect of its choice-of-law decisions is a contingent
question of New Jersey law?
Of course, if New Jersey were to have a rule of priority that
preferred New Jersey’s interests over sister states’ interests, it could
not impose this rule on other courts. New Jersey can say when
federal and sister state courts cannot use its law, not when they
must.129 But that is true of rules of scope, too. The most that a state
can do through its rules of scope is keep federal and sister state
courts from using its law.130 It cannot force them to do so. I see no
reason, therefore, why an a priori distinction concerning the extra-
jurisdictional effects of rules of priority and rules of scope should be
drawn.
To say that Roosevelt’s argument in favor of an Erie approach to
rules of scope fails does not mean, however, that his approach is
wrong. A state’s officials may in fact intend their rules of scope to
have extrajurisdictional effect. The problem is finding evidence,
given that the question is about dark matter.
Notice, once again, that the problem of dark matter does not arise
concerning federal law. On occasion, federal courts have decided the
territorial scope of federal law—that is, whether federal law applies
to transactions that cross international boundaries, such as events
abroad involving Americans or events in the United States involving
aliens.131 Here too, one can worry whether Erie or Swift is correct.
On the one hand, federal choice-of-law rules might be substantive
and therefore binding on state courts when entertaining these
federal actions. On the other hand, they might be procedural, in
which case state courts would be free to use their own choice-of-law
129. The situation would be different if only New Jersey had sufficient contacts to have
lawmaking power under Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981). In such
a case, sister states would be prohibited from applying their own law. See id. But the
restriction would be constitutional, rather than having its source in New Jersey law.
130. See Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 1874.
131. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
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rules for federal actions, just as they use their own rules when
determining whether sister state law should be used in an interna-
tional context.132 But the question is not about dark matter, for the
United States Supreme Court can answer it through direct review.
Although the Supreme Court has not, to my knowledge, ever held
that its choice-of-law rules are substantive, state courts must have
concluded that it would, for they have followed the Supreme Court’s
rules, not their own.133 
But in an interstate context there will, absent certification, be no
authoritative state court pronouncements on the matter. Can one
draw conclusions about how states think their own choice-of-law
decisions should be treated from the way they treat the decisions of
sister state courts? Consider, once again, the Swiftian approach to
the common law expressed in Slaton v. Hall.134 In Slaton, the
Georgia Supreme Court ignored Alabama decisions when determin-
ing the content of common law in Alabama.135 From this one might
conclude that it thought its own decisions concerning Georgia
common law could be ignored by federal and sister state courts
when adjudicating events in Georgia. As far as choice of law is
concerned, every state is Georgia. Whether it uses the First
Restatement or a modern approach, every state supreme court
thinks it can ignore sister state decisions when determining the
territorial scope of sister state law. This suggests that every state
supreme court thinks its own decisions can be ignored by federal
and sister state courts.136 
But because the question is about dark matter, no state supreme
court has had an occasion to make an authoritative statement about
132. See, e.g., King v. Car Rentals, Inc., 813 N.Y.S.2d 448, 450-51 (App. Div. 2006) (using
New York choice-of-law rules to determine applicability of New Jersey law in Quebec).
133. See, e.g., Am. Radio Ass’n v. Mobile S.S. Ass’n, 279 So. 2d 467, 470-72 (Ala. 1973)
(looking to federal cases, rather than Alabama choice-of-law rules, to determine territorial
scope of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)); Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Calhoon, 270
N.Y.S.2d 691, 694-95 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (looking to federal cases, rather than New York choice-
of-law rules, to determine territorial scope of the LMRA); Grennan v. Crowley Marine Servs.,
Inc., 116 P.3d 1024, 1025, 1027-29 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (looking to federal cases, rather than
Washington choice-of-law rules, to decide territorial scope of the Longshoreman and Harbor
Worker’s Compensation Act).
134. 148 S.E. 741, 743 (Ga. 1929).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
136. Cf. Lorenzen, supra note 106, at 517-18 (arguing that nations do not consider their
choice-of-law rules to be binding on foreign courts).
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the extrajurisdictional effect of its choice-of-law decisions. The
forum’s choice-of-law decisions may indicate only how it thinks
sister state choice-of-law decisions should be treated, not how it
thinks its own should be treated.137 
Can one argue for an Erie approach on the basis of the expecta-
tions of the parties? One argument against Swift, it will be remem-
bered, was that it left people unsure about the interpretation of the
general common law that a court might apply to their activities.138
The counterargument was that expectations were weak in a general
common law context because the general common law governed only
transactions that tended to cross state borders.139 Allowing federal
and sister state courts to collaborate in articulating a uniform
general common law standard was arguably more important than
party expectations. 
Concerning choice of law, the argument for Erie is even less
persuasive. There is a choice-of-law issue to be faced only if, as a
constitutional matter, more than one state’s law can be applied to
the parties.140 But courts have such constitutional discretion only if
party expectations about the applicable law are weak.141 
Another consideration suggests that a state’s officials might not
want their choice-of-law rules to have extrajurisdictional effect.
Consider once again Rhee v. Combined Enterprises, in which a
Maryland court applied New Jersey law to a Maryland couple who
got into an accident in New Jersey142—even though the New Jersey
Supreme Court had held in Veazey v. Doremus that New Jersey law
137. See Brilmayer, supra note 83, at 140-41. The only time that there is a reasonably clear
answer to the question of whether a state wants its rule of territorial scope to bind federal and
sister state courts—a situation that itself evokes Swift v. Tyson—is when the scope of a state’s
statute is specified in the statute itself. An example would be a Pennsylvania interspousal
immunity statute that limits its application to “Pennsylvania domiciliaries.” Fora respect such
limitations, even when their own choice-of-law rules would have come to a different conclusion
about the statute’s territorial scope. See Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 1858. Of course, even
here, skepticism about whether the limitation is meant to have extrajurisdictional effect is
possible.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
139. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
140. See supra note 129.
141. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981).
142. 536 A.2d 1197, 1198, 1203 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
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should not be used in such a case.143 As we have seen, Roosevelt
offers two possible descriptions of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
decision. It might be articulating a rule of scope—that is, holding
that New Jersey law does not apply to the facts. Or it might be
using a rule of priority, under which applicable New Jersey law
should yield to the law of a sister state.144
Although Roosevelt tends to offer a priori arguments that rules
of scope have extrajurisdictional effect and rules of priority do
not—as if the matter were not up to the state’s officials them-
selves—there is a reason to think that New Jersey officials would
not, in fact, want their rules of priority to be binding extrajuris-
dictionally. Larry Kramer has argued that we can understand a
state’s rules of priority as an overture in a process of negotiation
with sister states.145 When the New Jersey Supreme Court refrains
from applying its law due to a rule of priority, it is, in effect,
presenting a compromise to sister states, under which New Jersey
interests yield to the sister state’s in the case, provided that sister
state courts will return the favor when their positions are reversed.
But New Jersey would probably want to give sister state courts the
freedom to offer alternative compromises.146 To offer their alterna-
tives, sister state courts must be free to use New Jersey law even
when the New Jersey Supreme Court would not. To give them this
freedom, New Jersey’s rules of priority cannot have extrajuris-
dictional effect.147
Notice that Kramer’s argument does not depend upon a priori
reasoning. New Jersey officials could make their rules of priority
binding extrajurisdictionally if they wanted.148 But they would not
want to tie sister state courts’ hands. Kramer thinks the situation
is different, however, if—as was actually the case in Veazey—the
New Jersey Supreme Court refused to use New Jersey law because
143. 510 A.2d 1187, 1189 (N.J. 1986).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 100-07.
145. Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 105, at 315-16.
146. See id. at 318-38.
147. See Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 105, at 316-18; Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 105,
at 1029-34. 
148. For example, they may not want to give sister state courts the freedom to present
alternative compromises. Or they may think that the proper choice-of-law approach is a
matter of “conflicts justice,” which should not be subject to negotiation at all. See Kramer,
Renvoi, supra note 105, at 1018, 1038.
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New Jersey lacked an interest.149 Here Kramer suggests that New
Jersey would have no reason to give sister state courts freedom to
apply New Jersey law.150 After all, if New Jersey officials think their
state has no interest, what purpose is there in permitting sister
states to offer an alternative choice-of-law rule in which New Jersey
law is used? 
This argument fails, however. For New Jersey officials to give
their choice-of-law rule extrajurisdictional effect means forbidding
the Maryland court in Rhee from using New Jersey law. Because the
only other state’s law that can constitutionally be applied is
Maryland’s,151 that means insisting that Maryland law decide the
matter. But what if Maryland officials think that Maryland law does
not apply either? What happens?
One might argue that the absence of any governing law simply
means that the plaintiff fails to state a claim and that her action
against her husband should be dismissed. As an analogy, assume
that a New Yorker is upset because he was not invited to another
New Yorker’s birthday party in New York. If he sues her in New
York state court, asking for compensation for the emotional distress
this caused, his complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim. Under New York law, intentional infliction of emotional
distress requires that the defendant’s conduct be beyond the stan-
dards of civilized decency.152 Because the failure to invite someone
to a birthday party is, to put it mildly, not beyond the standards of
civilized decency, the plaintiff has no law entitling him to relief. Our
case looks comparable. Because neither New Jersey nor Maryland
law applies, the plaintiff has no law to sue under, and her action
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim too.153
But the cases are not comparable. Our New York plaintiff did not
fail to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
through the absence of New York law. He failed to state a claim
149. Id. at 1028-29. 
150. At times Kramer, like Roosevelt, suggests that it simply follows a priori that a state
supreme court’s interpretations of the territorial scope of the state’s law are binding
extrajurisdictionally. See supra note 127. But the argument I offer here is a reasonable
extrapolation from what Kramer says about rules of priority.
151. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981).
152. Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 90 (N.Y. 1983); Fischer v. Maloney,
373 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (N.Y. 1978).
153. See Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 1884-86. 
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through the presence of New York law. The defendant was permitted
by New York law not to invite the plaintiff to her birthday party. If
there really were an absence of governing law—a legal void—then
there would be no answer to the question of whether the defendant
was legally permitted to act as she did. But claiming that this
question has no answer is plainly incompatible with dismissing the
plaintiff ’s action for failure to state a claim, because that takes a
stand on the permissibility of the defendant’s actions. It would
appear, therefore, that if there really is a legal void,154 no court could
legitimately take jurisdiction of the action, because that would
mean applying law that does not exist.155
In short, a decision by New Jersey officials to give their choice-of-
law rule extrajurisdictional effect means that they are so committed
to New Jersey law not being used that they would prefer a legal void
in which no court could take jurisdiction. Although it is conceivable
that they would adopt such an uncompromising position, it is not
very likely. Faced with the prospect of an accident within New
Jersey falling into a legal void, they would surely relent and allow
New Jersey law to fill the gap. Thus, I see no reason why a state
would ever treat its choice-of-law rules—including its rules of
scope—as having extrajurisdictional effect.
But all of this is speculation. The only way to get an answer to the
question is to certify it to the New Jersey Supreme Court. It is odd
that no advocate of the Erie approach to choice of law has ever
mentioned certification. Why not just ask the New Jersey Supreme
Court whether, and when, it wants federal and sister state courts to
follow its choice-of-law decisions?
I believe that certification has been ignored because—as is often
the case with dark matter—the systematic absence of authoritative
cases on point has made the issue look jurisprudential and so
answerable by a priori reasoning. But this is a mistake. The conflict
between Erie and Swift in choice of law—like the original conflict
154. Hans Kelsen is an example of a philosopher of law who rejects the very possibility of
legal voids. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 126 (Max Knight trans., 1967)
(translating HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE (2d ed. 1960)); see also RONALD MOORE,
LEGAL NORMS AND LEGAL SCIENCE: A CRITICAL STUDY OF KELSEN’S PURE THEORY OF LAW 160
(1978); Green, Logic of Legal Systems, supra note 14, at 376 n.40.
155. Alternatively, one might argue that, as a constitutional matter, there must be law
governing the issue and thus either Maryland or New Jersey is compelled to extend its law
to the facts. 
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between Erie and Swift concerning the general common law—is a
perfectly parochial state law issue about the extrajurisdictional
effect of state court decisions. It has taken on a misty and jurispru-
dential aura only because it is about dark matter. The certification
of some well-drafted questions to state supreme courts would solve
the problem. I think advocates of an Erie approach would be disap-
pointed by the answer they got.156
156. There remains, however, the possibility of a constitutional argument in favor of an
Erie approach—that is, one that depends upon the antidiscrimination principle I describe in
Green, supra note 27, at 1136-54, 1162-67; see also supra note 88. If this argument succeeds,
a state supreme court is not permitted to free federal and sister state courts from their duty
to respect the state’s rules of scope, unless it is willing to free its own lower courts from the
same duty. 
